THE FIRE NEXT TIME

A Marxist-Leninist-Trotskyist Theory of Revolution in Pakistan

Against Empire, Against Feudalism, Against the Epstein Class

For the Liberation of Pakistan and the Global South

Pakistani Prometheus

Just another Pakistani

April 2026

"The philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various ways. The point, however, is to change it."

— Karl Marx, Theses on Feuerbach, 1845

"You may not be interested in war, but war is interested in you."

— Leon Trotsky

"The condition of man... is a condition of war of everyone against everyone."

— Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan — and Pakistan, every single day

I. The World That Made Us

I am writing this from Pakistan in April 2026, and the world is on fire.

The United States of America — the self-appointed guardian of democracy, human rights, and the "rules-based international order" — is waging a war against Iran at Israel's command. It is financing, arming, and diplomatically shielding a genocide in Palestine that has killed tens of thousands of civilians, the majority of them children. Its president is a man credibly linked to Jeffrey Epstein's network of child sexual exploitation. Its citizens are marching in the streets by the millions, nine million on a single day in March 2026, under the banner of "No Kings," because they have finally realised what the rest of us have known for decades: their democracy is a fiction, their freedom is a brand, and their government serves no one but the class of predators who own it.

Meanwhile, in Pakistan, we are told to wait. We are told that democracy will mature. We are told that the next election will be different. We are told that the judiciary will reform, that the military will return to the barracks, that the feudal lords will eventually loosen their grip, that the economy will stabilise, that the IMF will help. We have been told these things for seventy-eight years. We are still waiting. We will wait forever if we continue to believe them.

This paper is not about waiting. This paper is about burning down the house and building something from the ashes. Not metaphorically. Not eventually. Not when conditions are perfect. Now. Within our lifetimes. Within the next ten to twenty years.

I am proposing, with full seriousness and full awareness of the consequences, a communist revolution in Pakistan. Grounded in the theoretical traditions of Marx, Lenin, and Trotsky. Adapted to the specific material, ethnic, religious, and geopolitical conditions of this country. Aimed not merely at regime change but at the total transformation of the mode of production, the destruction of the feudal and military-capitalist ruling class,

and the construction of a workers' state governed by the people who actually make this country function.

I am not an armchair theorist. I am not writing from exile. I am writing from the belly of the beast. I cannot put my real name on it — the ISI would see to that. So call me the Pakistani Prometheus. I am just another Pakistani who has decided to steal fire from the gods. And I have had enough.

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II. The Global Backdrop: Empire in Decline, Genocide in Motion

II.I. The American Myth Is Dead

I was raised, as most Pakistanis were, to believe that America represented something better. Better governance. Better morality. Better systems. The myth was everywhere — in our textbooks, in Hollywood, in the reverent way our politicians spoke about Washington. America was the benchmark. We were the failure. The gap between us and them was the gap between civilisation and its absence.

That myth is dead, and its corpse is rotting in full public view.

In 2026, the United States is governed by a man who rode to power on bigotry, spectacle, and the financial backing of an oligarchic class so depraved that its most prominent network — the Epstein network — was dedicated to the sexual exploitation of children. The evidence is extensive. The victims are numerous. The files have been suppressed. The institutions of American democracy — the courts, the Congress, the intelligence agencies, the media — have not failed to hold this class accountable. They have actively shielded it. This is not a conspiracy theory. It is the observable functioning of a system designed to protect its ruling class at all costs.

I call this ruling class the Epstein Class: the stratum of financial, political, and social elites whose power is so deeply embedded in the architecture of liberal capitalist democracy that every mechanism of accountability — every court, every election, every newsroom — functions not to constrain them

but to insulate them. The Epstein Class does not need to conspire. The system conspires for them. The courts defer to their lawyers. The media depends on their advertising. The politicians depend on their donations. And the intelligence agencies depend on their cooperation — or, more accurately, are intertwined with them at the operational level.

Marx diagnosed this a hundred and fifty years ago: the state is the executive committee of the ruling class. The Epstein Class is simply the most grotesque, most contemporary, most undeniable proof that he was right.

II.II. The Genocide in Palestine

If the Epstein Class reveals the domestic architecture of American impunity, Palestine reveals its international architecture.

Since October 2023, the state of Israel has conducted a campaign of systematic destruction in Gaza that has killed tens of thousands of Palestinian civilians. The majority are women and children. Entire neighbourhoods have been erased from the map. Hospitals have been bombed while patients lay in their beds. Schools used as shelters have been targeted with precision munitions. The infrastructure of civilian life — water systems, power grids, sanitation, food distribution networks — has been methodically annihilated. Starvation has been weaponised. Displacement has been total. The International Court of Justice has found it plausible that genocide is being committed. International legal scholars across the world have concurred.

And the United States has ensured, through its Security Council veto, through billions of dollars in military aid, through diplomatic cover at every international forum, that nothing — nothing — is done to stop it.

Let this be stated plainly, because too many people still speak in euphemisms: what is happening in Palestine is genocide. It is being committed by Israel. It is being enabled, financed, armed, and protected by the United States of America. The so-called rules-based international order — the system that was supposed to prevent exactly this — has been exposed as a mechanism of selective enforcement: the rules apply to the enemies of

Washington and are suspended for its allies. International law, as it exists today, is the law of empire dressed in the language of universalism.

For those of us in the Muslim world, in the Global South, in Pakistan — Palestine is not a foreign policy issue. It is the single clearest proof that the global order is designed against us. That our lives, our children's lives, are worth less. That the word "humanity" in Western mouths means "our humanity," and everyone else is collateral.

II.III. The War on Iran

And then there is the war. In early 2026, the United States and Israel launched a military campaign against Iran. Not because Iran posed an imminent threat to American security. Not because the American people demanded it — they were marching against it by the millions. But because the architecture of the US-Israel relationship — decades of lobbying, ideological capture by Christian Zionism and neoconservatism, the structural integration of the Israeli and American defence industries — has made American foreign policy in the Middle East effectively subordinate to Israeli strategic calculations.

This is Israel's war, fought with American blood, American money, and American credibility. Its purpose is the elimination of a regional rival and the consolidation of Israeli military hegemony. Its consequences are borne by Iranian civilians under American bombs, by American soldiers deployed to die for a cause that serves no American interest, and by every country in the region — including Pakistan — that must now navigate the fallout.

I write this from a country that shares a physical border with Iran. The war is not an abstraction for us. When American bombs fall on Iranian cities, the tremors reach Balochistan. When the Strait of Hormuz is threatened, our energy imports are imperilled. When the region destabilises, our refugees multiply, our security deteriorates, our economy buckles. And we had no say in any of it. No Pakistani was consulted. No Pakistani voted. No Pakistani interest is served. But we will pay, as we have paid for every American war in our region since 1979.

II.IV. The Decline Is Our Opportunity

But here is the thing about an empire at war with the world and at war with itself: it is weakening. The America of 2026 is not the America of 1991. The unipolar moment is over. The economy is hollowed out by decades of financialisation and deindustrialisation. The political system is paralysed. Nine million of its own citizens are in the streets. The war with Iran is draining resources and credibility. The Epstein files are a festering wound of illegitimacy. The infrastructure is crumbling. The social fabric is disintegrating.

This decline is not something to observe passively. It is something to welcome, to support, and to use. Every crack in American imperial power is a window of opportunity for the rest of the world. Every dollar spent bombing Tehran is a dollar not spent destabilising Islamabad. Every protest that consumes Washington's attention is a moment when the periphery can breathe, organise, and build.

The dismantling of American imperialism is not a utopian fantasy. It is a precondition for political freedom anywhere on earth. As long as a single state possesses the power to overthrow governments, starve nations through sanctions, shield genocides with its veto, and wage wars of aggression with impunity, no alternative political project is safe. No revolution can succeed. No experiment can mature. The empire must fall. Not because we wish suffering on the American people — they are victims of their own ruling class, as the No Kings marches make clear. But because the apparatus of American imperial power is the single greatest obstacle to human liberation on this planet, and its dissolution is the minimum necessary condition for a just world.

And within that dissolution, within that window, Pakistan can be reborn.

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III. Pakistan: The Diagnosis

To theorise a revolution, you must first understand what you are revolting against. Pakistan's crisis is not a single crisis. It is a layered, interlocking

system of domination in which feudalism, military capitalism, religious obscurantism, and imperial subservience reinforce one another to produce a state that functions for no one except the people who control it.

III.I. The Feudal Stranglehold

Pakistan is, in significant parts of its territory, a feudal state. Not metaphorically. Literally. In Sindh, in southern Punjab, in parts of Balochistan, landholding families exercise near-total control over the economic, political, and social lives of millions of people. The hari — the landless peasant, the bonded labourer — works land he does not own, under conditions he did not choose, for a master whose authority is enforced not merely by economic dependence but by private militias, corrupt police, and compliant courts.

These feudal families are not remnants of a pre-modern past. They are active, powerful, and deeply embedded in the machinery of the Pakistani state. They sit in parliament. They run political parties — the Pakistan Peoples Party, for all its socialist rhetoric, is functionally a coalition of Sindhi feudal lords. They control the local judiciary, the police, and the revenue administration. They have converted democratic institutions into instruments of dynastic power.

The feudal system is not a problem to be reformed. It is a class enemy to be destroyed. Land must be seized and redistributed. The biggest feudal lords must be made examples of — not through bureaucratic land reform that they will co-opt and evade, as they have co-opted and evaded every land reform since 1959, but through direct, forceful redistribution carried out by the peasants themselves, organised into revolutionary councils and backed by the armed power of the revolution.

III.II. The Military-Industrial Leviathan

If feudalism controls the land, the military controls everything else. The Pakistan Army is not merely a defence force. It is the single most powerful economic, political, and institutional actor in the country. It runs a business empire — Fauji Foundation, Askari Bank, Defence Housing Authority, Frontier Works Organisation — worth billions of dollars. It owns

agricultural land, urban real estate, cement factories, banks, and fertiliser plants. It has its own intelligence agency — the ISI — which operates as a state within the state, manipulating elections, controlling the media, sponsoring militant proxies, and conducting operations that no elected government has ever been able to oversee, let alone control.

The military has ruled Pakistan directly for roughly half of its existence and indirectly for most of the rest. Every civilian government that has attempted to assert independence from the military has been overthrown, dismissed, or undermined. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto was hanged. Nawaz Sharif was overthrown. Imran Khan was removed and imprisoned. The pattern is not a series of unfortunate exceptions. It is the fundamental operating logic of the Pakistani state: the military rules, and civilians are permitted to govern only insofar as they do not challenge military prerogatives.

Any revolution in Pakistan must confront the military. Not gradually. Not through negotiation. Not through the fantasy of "civilian supremacy" that every politician promises and none delivers. The military's business empire must be nationalised in its entirety and placed under the control of revolutionary councils. Its land holdings must be redistributed. Its officer corps must be dismantled and restructured — not reformed, because reform implies the preservation of the institution's existing power structure. The junior ranks — the soldiers who come from the same working-class and peasant families that the revolution serves — must be recruited into the revolutionary project. The generals must face tribunals.

The ISI presents a specific challenge. It is, for all its sins, a repository of institutional intelligence capability that a revolutionary state in Pakistan's geopolitical position cannot afford to discard. Pakistan faces real security threats — from India, from the remnants of the old order, from imperial intervention. The ISI must therefore be reformed, not dissolved — but the reform must be total. Its mandate must be rewritten to serve the revolutionary state. Its command structure must be subordinated to the revolutionary council. Its operations must be transparent to the council. Any officer who cannot or will not align with the new ideological framework must be removed. The ISI must become an instrument of the revolution, not its competitor.

This is the hardest part of the revolution, and anyone who pretends otherwise is not serious. The military will not surrender its empire peacefully. It will resist. It will attempt coups. It will use the ISI to infiltrate and sabotage. It will seek foreign support. The revolution must be prepared for armed confrontation, and it must be strong enough — in numbers, in organisation, in popular legitimacy, and in arms — to win.

III.III. The Failure of Every Party

Pakistan's political parties have, without exception, failed the people they claim to represent.

The Pakistan Peoples Party was founded on genuine socialist principles. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto promised roti, kapda, aur makaan — bread, clothing, and shelter. He nationalised industries, passed land reform legislation, and gave the working class, for the first time in Pakistan's history, a sense that the state might work for them. But Bhutto was also an autocrat, a feudal lord himself, and his party was always a contradiction: socialist rhetoric layered over feudal structure. After his execution, the party passed — like a feudal estate — to his daughter, and then to his grandson. Today, the PPP is nothing. It is a coalition of Sindhi feudal families presiding over the most oppressed, most impoverished, most exploited population in the country, and it has been doing so for decades. The socialist roots were real. The betrayal was also real. And it was total.

The Pakistan Muslim League in its various forms — PML-N, PML-Q — has never pretended to be anything other than what it is: the party of Punjab's urban bourgeoisie and rural landlords, allied with the military when convenient and discarded by it when not.

And then there is PTI. Imran Khan's movement is the most interesting failure, because it came closest to channelling genuine revolutionary energy and squandered it completely. The PTI movement proved something essential: that millions of Pakistanis, particularly young Pakistanis, are willing to fight. They stormed barricades. They faced tear gas. They endured imprisonment. The energy was real, visceral, and powerful. But the ideology was empty. PTI was a personality cult built on vague promises of

anti-corruption and “naya Pakistan” that never materialised into a coherent programme for structural change. Khan himself was a bourgeois nationalist — a Westernised elite who flirted with the military establishment, governed through the same bureaucratic structures he promised to dismantle, and offered the working class nothing but rhetoric.

The lesson of PTI is not that Pakistani youth cannot be mobilised. The lesson is that they were mobilised for the wrong cause, under the wrong leadership, with the wrong ideology. The energy is there. The willingness to sacrifice is there. What is missing is a framework worthy of that sacrifice. That framework is Marxism-Leninism-Trotskyism, and the vehicle for it must be built from scratch.

III.IV. Religion as Obstacle

This will be the most controversial section of this paper, and I will not soften it.

Religion, in Pakistan, is an obstacle to revolution. Not Islam in the abstract — not the personal faith of ordinary believers, which is their own affair. But the institutionalised religious apparatus: the madrassa system, the ulema class, the religious political parties — TLP, JUI-F, and their various offshoots — and the broader ideological infrastructure that uses Islam as a tool of social control, political manipulation, and the suppression of class consciousness.

The ulema class in Pakistan functions as an adjunct to the ruling order. It provides theological justification for feudal authority, for patriarchal domination, for obedience to the state, and for the suppression of any political movement that challenges the existing hierarchy. The madrassa system produces not educated citizens but ideological foot soldiers for a worldview that is fundamentally incompatible with class liberation, gender equality, and scientific materialism.

The religious political parties — TLP with its mob politics, JUI-F with its feudal-clerical hybrid power structure — are not merely political opponents. They are ideological enemies of the revolution. Their leadership cannot be co-opted and their institutional structure cannot be reformed. They must be

confronted ideologically before the revolution begins, and they must be politically neutralised after it.

This confrontation must be ideological first. The revolution cannot position itself as anti-Islam in a country where Islam is the identity of the overwhelming majority. That would be suicidal. But it can and must position itself against the instrumentalisation of Islam by the ruling class. It must make the case — rigorously, patiently, repeatedly — that the ulema do not speak for God; they speak for the feudal lords and generals who fund their madrassas. That the TLP does not defend the Prophet; it defends a political order that keeps the faithful poor, uneducated, and compliant. That true justice — the justice that Islam itself claims to seek — is incompatible with the feudal, military-capitalist system that the religious establishment props up.

The ulema class must be politically neutralised. Not through persecution — that would make martyrs and strengthen them. But through education, through the construction of a universal secular education system that replaces the madrassa as the primary institution of learning for Pakistan's poorest children, and through the systematic removal of religious authority from the apparatus of the state. Religion becomes a private matter. The state becomes secular. And the ulema, deprived of state power and institutional funding, become what they should always have been: spiritual advisors to those who choose to consult them, not political power brokers.

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IV. The Revolutionary Base: Who Fights?

A revolution without a base is a coup. A revolution with the wrong base is a catastrophe. The question of who constitutes the revolutionary subject in Pakistan is not academic. It is the question on which everything else depends.

The answer is: everyone who is crushed by the current system, unified by ideology, and led by the educated youth.

IV.I. The Industrial Working Class

Pakistan has an industrial working class. It is concentrated in Faisalabad, Sialkot, Lahore, Karachi, and the smaller industrial towns of Punjab and Sindh. It works in textile mills, garment factories, tanneries, steel works, and manufacturing plants under conditions that would be recognisable to a nineteenth-century Manchester factory worker: long hours, starvation wages, no safety protections, no job security, no voice. Pakistan's trade union movement — once vibrant, once a genuine political force — has been systematically dismantled by decades of anti-labour legislation, military repression, and the deliberate informalization of the economy.

The trade unions must be rebuilt. Not as the co-opted, bureaucratised husks they have become, but as revolutionary organs of working-class power. Every factory, every mill, every workshop is a potential base of organisation. The workers already know they are exploited. What they lack is not awareness but organisation, leadership, and a political framework that connects their daily struggle to a larger revolutionary project. That is the vanguard's task.

IV.II. The Landless Peasantry

In Sindh and southern Punjab, millions of peasants live in conditions that can only be described as servitude. The hari system is feudalism in its purest form: landless families bound to estates they do not own, working for lords who control every aspect of their lives — their livelihoods, their housing, their access to water, their interactions with the state. Women in these communities face a double oppression: class and gender, enforced by feudal patriarchs and sanctified by religious authority.

The peasantry is the sleeping giant of Pakistani revolution. When the land is seized and redistributed — when the hari is given ownership of the land he has worked for generations — the feudal system collapses overnight. This is not gradualism. This is not reform. It is the direct, forceful expropriation of feudal land holdings and their transfer to peasant councils. The biggest feudal lords are targeted first, publicly, as examples. The message is unmistakable: the age of the wadera is over.

IV.III. The Urban Youth and the Educated Precariat

And then there are the young. Pakistan has one of the youngest populations on earth. More than sixty percent of its people are under thirty. They are educated enough to understand their condition and angry enough to want to change it. They have university degrees and no jobs. They have smartphones and social media and a window into a world that seems to function for everyone except them. They watched PTI's rise and fall. They saw that the system cannot be changed from within.

The educated youth are the vanguard's natural recruiting ground. They have the literacy to engage with Marxist theory. They have the digital fluency to organise across geographic and ethnic lines. They have the energy, the rage, and the willingness to sacrifice that every revolutionary movement requires. PTI proved that they will take to the streets. The revolution must give them something worth taking to the streets for.

The unity of these three groups — industrial workers, landless peasants, and educated urban youth — is the precondition for revolution. No single group can succeed alone. The workers have numbers but lack organisation. The peasants have grievances but lack mobility. The youth have energy but lack a base in productive labour. United, under a coherent ideological framework, they are unstoppable. The revolution's first and most critical task is to forge this unity.

IV.IV. The Pan-Ethnic Imperative

Pakistan's ethnic divisions — Punjabi, Sindhi, Pashtun, Baloch, Muhajir, Saraiki, Hazara — have been exploited by every ruling class in the country's history. The military has used ethnic division to justify its role as the "neutral arbiter." Political parties have built ethnic vote banks. Feudal lords have maintained control by positioning themselves as ethnic champions.

The revolution must be pan-ethnic from its inception. Not as an afterthought. Not as a coalition of ethnic movements. But as a movement that is constitutively, ideologically, and organisationally pan-ethnic from day one. Class is the primary contradiction. Ethnicity is a secondary contradiction exploited by the ruling class to prevent class unity. The

revolution's message is simple: the Punjabi factory worker and the Sindhi hari and the Baloch fisherman and the Pashtun labourer have more in common with each other than any of them has with the feudal lord or general or industrialist of their own ethnicity.

The Baloch liberation movement deserves specific mention. The Baloch people have endured decades of military operation, enforced disappearances, extrajudicial killings, and economic exploitation at the hands of the Pakistani state. Their struggle for justice is not separate from the revolution — it is a natural component of it. Revolutionary Pakistan recognises the Baloch struggle, incorporates it into the broader anti-state movement, and offers the Baloch people what the Pakistani state never has: genuine autonomy, economic justice, and political dignity within a restructured federation of workers' councils.

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V. The Vanguard: Building the Party

There is no revolution without a vanguard party. This is Lenin's central contribution, and history has vindicated it without exception. Spontaneous mass uprisings can topple governments — the Arab Spring proved that. But they cannot build new states, because they lack the ideological coherence, the organisational discipline, and the strategic continuity to survive the counterrevolution that inevitably follows.

Pakistan needs a new party. Not a reformed PPP. Not a radicalised PTI. A new party, built from scratch, grounded in Marxism-Leninism-Trotskyism, and designed for the specific conditions of twenty-first-century Pakistan.

V.I. Underground First

The party begins underground. This is not romanticism. It is operational necessity. Pakistan's intelligence apparatus — the ISI, Military Intelligence, the IB — has decades of experience infiltrating, disrupting, and destroying political movements. Any openly communist party will be targeted for suppression before it can achieve critical mass. The early stages of

organisation must be conducted with the operational security of a clandestine movement.

Underground does not mean invisible. It means that the party's structure, membership, and strategic planning are protected, while its ideas are disseminated openly. The party organises in three spaces simultaneously: universities and student unions, where ideological education and recruitment take place; factory floors and industrial zones, where workers' cells are built within existing union structures or, where unions do not exist, created from scratch; and digital networks, where public agitation happens on social media while operational coordination happens on encrypted channels.

The dual digital strategy is essential. Social media — Twitter, TikTok, YouTube, Facebook — is the revolution's megaphone. It is where consciousness is raised, where the narrative is shaped, where millions of young Pakistanis who have never encountered Marxist ideas are introduced to them. But social media is also surveilled, and anything said on a public platform must be assumed to be monitored by the state. Operational communication — cell structures, logistics, strategic planning — happens on encrypted platforms, through offline meetings, through the disciplined compartmentalisation that every successful clandestine movement has employed.

The party goes public only when it is strong enough that suppression would cost the state more than toleration. When its cells are embedded in enough factories, enough universities, enough unions, enough neighbourhoods, that dismantling it would require a level of repression that the state cannot sustain without triggering precisely the mass uprising the party is preparing for.

V.II. Cadre, Not Members

The party is built on cadre, not mass membership. The distinction is Lenin's, and it is critical. A mass party collects names. A cadre party produces revolutionaries. Every member of the vanguard must be ideologically educated, organisationally disciplined, and personally committed to the

revolutionary project. Quality over quantity, until quantity becomes possible without sacrificing quality.

Cadre education is rigorous. Every member reads Marx, Lenin, and Trotsky — not as sacred texts but as analytical tools to be understood, debated, and applied to Pakistani conditions. Every member understands the history of failed revolutions — the Soviet degeneration, the Chinese betrayal, the Cuban survival — and can articulate why those outcomes occurred and how this revolution will avoid them. Every member can explain, in plain language, to a factory worker or a peasant or a student, why capitalism is the cause of their suffering and what the alternative looks like.

V.III. Women at the Centre

The revolution's position on women's liberation is not a footnote. It is not a "gender policy" to be developed after the "real" work of class struggle is done. The liberation of women is central to the revolution from its first day, and patriarchy must be dismantled as aggressively as feudalism.

This is not merely a moral position, though it is that. It is a strategic one. Pakistan's feudal and religious power structures are fundamentally patriarchal. The feudal lord's control over the peasant is reinforced by his control over the peasant's wife and daughters. The mullah's authority rests on a gendered hierarchy that subordinates women theologically. You cannot destroy feudalism without destroying the patriarchal family structure that supports it. You cannot neutralise the ulema without confronting the gendered ideology they propagate.

Women must hold leadership positions in the vanguard from its inception. Women's councils must have autonomous organising power within the revolutionary structure. And the revolutionary programme must include, as non-negotiable demands: universal education for girls and women, legal equality in all domains, the criminalisation of honour-based violence, reproductive autonomy, and the systematic dismantling of every legal, cultural, and institutional mechanism that subordinates women.

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VI. The Revolution: What It Looks Like

This paper theorises. It does not instruct. I will not provide a step-by-step operational manual, both because the specific tactics must emerge from the specific conditions of the moment and because publishing such a manual would be strategically foolish. But the broad shape of the revolution can and must be outlined, because a movement without a vision of victory is a movement without direction.

VI.I. Simultaneous, Not Sequential

The revolution must ignite in multiple cities simultaneously. Not because coordination is easy — it is extraordinarily difficult — but because isolation is death. A revolution confined to Karachi will be surrounded and crushed. A revolution confined to Lahore will be cut off from Sindh and Balochistan. The state's playbook is containment: isolate the uprising, control the narrative, deploy force against a localised target. The counter to containment is simultaneity. When Karachi, Lahore, Faisalabad, Peshawar, Quetta, Hyderabad, and Multan move at once, the state's capacity to respond is overwhelmed.

VI.II. Armed Revolution Is Inevitable

I will not pretend otherwise. The Pakistani state will not surrender its power because people march in the streets. The feudal lords will not hand over their land because peasants demand it. The generals will not dismantle their empire because a party publishes a manifesto. Power concedes nothing without a demand, and in Pakistan, that demand will ultimately be backed by force.

This is not a glorification of violence. It is a recognition of reality. The state has a monopoly on organised violence, and it has demonstrated — in Balochistan, in the tribal areas, in every political crisis in the country's history — that it is willing to use that violence against its own people. A revolution that is not prepared to defend itself is a revolution that has already failed.

The recruitment of junior military ranks is essential here. The soldiers of the Pakistan Army — the sepoys, the NCOs, the young officers — are drawn from the same communities the revolution serves. Their families are workers and peasants. Their wages are low. Their lives are expendable to the generals who command them. The vanguard's task is to make these soldiers understand that their class interest lies with the revolution, not with the officer corps. Every successful revolution in history — Russia in 1917, Cuba in 1959 — has involved a split in the armed forces. Pakistan will be no different.

VI.III. The Mass Mobilisation

Arms alone do not make a revolution. Numbers do. The revolution must mobilise millions — not thousands, millions — of ordinary Pakistanis into the streets, the factories, the fields. PTI's mobilisations proved this is possible. The No Kings protests in America proved it at a scale that shook the most powerful state on earth. Pakistan's revolutionary mobilisation must dwarf both.

The mobilisation is not a single event. It is the culmination of years of patient organising: trade union building, student radicalisation, peasant councils, ideological education, digital agitation. When the moment comes — and the moment always comes, triggered by an economic crisis, a military atrocity, a political betrayal that breaks the camel's back — the infrastructure must already be in place to channel the anger into revolution rather than letting it dissipate into another round of protests that change nothing.

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VII. The Day After: Revolutionary Pakistan

A revolution that cannot describe what it is building is a revolution that deserves to fail. Here is what revolutionary Pakistan looks like.

VII.I. The State

Parliament is dissolved. The judiciary is dissolved. The existing bureaucracy is dissolved. These institutions are not reformed because they are not reformable. They were designed to serve the feudal-military-capitalist ruling class, and they have performed that function with remarkable efficiency for seventy-eight years. They are replaced, in their entirety, by a system of workers' councils: local councils constituted on occupational and communal lines, federated upward into regional and national coordinating bodies.

The national revolutionary council governs. Its members are elected by and from local councils. They serve fixed terms. They are paid workers' wages. They are subject to recall. And they are subject to the Kill Switch — the structural dissolution mechanism described in my companion paper, which ensures that revolutionary power cannot consolidate into a new ruling class.

VII.II. The Economy

Nationalisation is immediate and total. Banks, heavy industry, telecommunications, energy, transport, and all major means of production are brought under public ownership on day one. Feudal land holdings are expropriated and redistributed to peasant councils. The military's business empire — Fauji Foundation, Askari Bank, DHA, all of it — is nationalised and placed under revolutionary council control.

The economy is planned, not marketised. Production is organised to meet human needs, not to generate profit. Housing, food, healthcare, education, and transport are provided as rights, not commodities. The informal economy — which constitutes a vast portion of Pakistan's actual economic activity — is formalised, its workers brought into the structure of councils and unions, their labour recognised and their rights guaranteed.

CPEC infrastructure is retained. The roads, the ports, the power plants built under the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor are national assets, and they remain national assets. But the terms of the arrangement are renegotiated. Predatory debt is restructured. Exploitative contracts are voided. China, as a tactical ally of revolutionary Pakistan, is engaged pragmatically: we use what serves us and reject what does not. Ideological independence from

Beijing is non-negotiable. China's state capitalism is not our model. But its infrastructure is useful, and revolutionary Pakistan is pragmatic enough to use it.

VII.III. Healthcare and Education

Healthcare is nationalised immediately. Private hospitals are seized and integrated into a universal public health system. Community health workers are deployed to every village and neighbourhood. Doctors are retrained for public service. Healthcare becomes what it should always have been: a right, free at the point of access, available to every Pakistani regardless of class, ethnicity, or geography.

Education is rebuilt from the ground up. The madrassa system is replaced — not by a state propaganda machine, but by a universal secular education system that teaches critical thinking, scientific materialism, history, literature, and exposure to all ideologies including Marxism, liberalism, and religious philosophy. The goal is not to produce obedient citizens. It is to produce thinking ones. Children who can analyse, question, and hold their own revolutionary government accountable are the ultimate safeguard against degeneration.

VII.IV. Media

Media is completely free. This is non-negotiable. A revolution that suppresses the press has already betrayed itself. But ownership must never be in the hands of the elite and powerful. Corporate media ownership is abolished. Feudal media ownership is abolished. Media organisations are owned by their workers — journalists, editors, technicians — organised into cooperatives. Strict structural measures ensure that no individual, no family, no faction can accumulate the kind of media power that the Jang Group, the Dawn Group, and the ARY network exercise today. The press is free to criticise the revolutionary government. Indeed, it is expected to.

VII.V. Defence and the Nuclear Arsenal

Revolutionary Pakistan is a fortress. Self-reliant defence is the strategic doctrine. All foreign military agreements are terminated. All foreign bases

are closed. The US alliance is ended — completely, permanently, without ambiguity.

Pakistan's nuclear arsenal is retained, expanded, and placed under the direct control of the revolutionary council. This is non-negotiable. In a world where American imperialism and Indian expansionism both pose existential threats, nuclear deterrence is not a luxury. It is a survival mechanism. Revolutionary Pakistan will not disarm. It will not submit to the hypocritical nonproliferation regime that permits Israel to maintain an undeclared arsenal while demanding that Muslim-majority states remain defenceless.

VII.VI. International Posture

Revolutionary Pakistan does not withdraw from the world. It transforms its relationship with it. Trotsky's permanent revolution is the guiding principle: the revolution cannot survive in one country; it must be exported, supported, and extended.

Revolutionary Pakistan actively supports revolutionary movements across the Global South. It supports the liberation of Palestine. It supports the Afghan people's liberation from the Taliban. It recognises the Indian working class as natural allies and the Indian state as a class enemy. It builds a socialist international with like-minded movements and governments. It offers itself as proof that the revolution is possible — that the empire can be defied, that the feudal lords can be overthrown, that the generals can be defeated, and that a state can be built that serves its people rather than its predators.

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VIII. The Fire Next Time

I know what the objections will be. It is unrealistic. It is dangerous. It is extremist. The conditions are not ripe. The people are not ready. The military is too strong. The Americans will intervene. Islam will resist. The economy will collapse. It has been tried and it has failed.

I have heard every one of these objections, and I reject them all.

Unrealistic? What is unrealistic is the belief that a country governed by feudal lords, controlled by generals, looted by oligarchs, and subservient to an empire that is using our neighbour for target practice will somehow, through elections and incremental reform, become a just society. That is the fantasy. Revolution is the realism.

Dangerous? Of course it is dangerous. Everything worth doing is dangerous. The status quo is also dangerous — it kills people every day through poverty, through preventable disease, through feudal violence, through military operations in Balochistan, through the slow grinding annihilation of human potential that is life in Pakistan for the vast majority of its people. The question is not whether to accept danger but which danger to choose.

The people are not ready? The people are never ready until they are. No one predicted the Russian Revolution in January 1917. No one predicted the fall of the Berlin Wall. No one predicted that nine million Americans would march against their own government in a single day. History does not announce itself. It erupts. The vanguard's task is not to wait for readiness but to create it.

It has been tried and it has failed? It has been sabotaged and it has been betrayed. The American empire has spent a century ensuring that no socialist experiment succeeds, through coups, assassinations, sanctions, and wars. To judge socialism by the results of that sabotage is to judge a patient by the disease their doctor injected them with. The empire is weakening. The saboteur is distracted. The window is opening.

I am not calling for revolution tomorrow. I am calling for the work that makes revolution possible in ten to twenty years. The building of cadre. The radicalisation of unions. The education of youth. The forging of pan-ethnic solidarity. The preparation — ideological, organisational, and material — for the moment when the contradictions of the Pakistani state reach their breaking point and the people are ready to seize what is rightfully theirs.

The world is watching itself burn. America is at war. Palestine is being erased. The Epstein Class sits untouched. Nine million Americans march and nothing changes. And here in Pakistan, the feudal lords still rule, the

generals still loot, the children still die of diseases that cost pennies to cure, and we are told to be patient.

I am done being patient.

The fire next time will not be a protest. It will not be an election. It will not be a hashtag or a viral video or a Supreme Court petition. It will be a revolution — organised, armed, ideologically grounded, and structurally safeguarded against every pathology that has destroyed every previous attempt.

It will be built by workers and peasants and students and women and every Pakistani who has been told, for seventy-eight years, that their suffering is the price of a nation that was never built for them.

I am the Pakistani Prometheus. I am just another Pakistani. And this is my contribution to the fire.

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